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RAY WATCHING:  THE HIGHLY PROTECTE D ,  
BRITISH PRISON EXPER IENCE OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING’S KILLER  
 
 
Fifty years after his assassination, Martin Luther King is well established as a national icon 
and commemorations will be marked by largely well-intentioned eulogies to the slain 
advocate of non-violence. The anniversary will also see fresh discussion of the murder itself 
and the likelihood of a conspiracy that went beyond the lone gunman James Earl Ray (Pepper 
2016; Lane and Gregory 2015; Weisberg 2013; Wexler and Hancock 2012; Emison 2014; 
Melanson 1989; Ray JE 1997; Ray J 2011; Ray JL 2008; Posner 1998). Given the many 
books discussing Ray’s guilt or innocence, it is striking how little attention has been given to 
Ray’s time imprisoned in Britain, which is the focus of this article. Ray’s capture occurred at 
a time when the US government was facing increasing criticism for its Vietnam policy and 
amidst major demonstrations outside US embassy around Europe. The Labour Party in 
Britain contained outspoken critics of US policy, and this helped to ensure that the Wilson 
government remained unresponsive to US request for UK participation, alongside other 
nations like Australia, in the Vietnam conflict (Dobson 1988, 1990; Dumbrell 1996; Ellis 
2001; Young 2001; Boyle 2003; and Vickers 2008). At the same time, Commonwealth 
immigration to Britain and rising domestic racial tensions ensured that British officials were 
more than passive spectators of the unfolding civil rights movement in the United States 
(Layton-Henry 1993). The American experience was largely seen as cautionary; a warning of 
what Britain might face if it allowed the situation to get out of control.  Indeed, both 
immigration and race relations reform were under consideration by the UK Parliament in 
1968.1 It was in this context that the murder of Martin Luther King Jr. on April 4 1968 
shocked the world and launched a manhunt. Under a media spotlight, this search spread 
rapidly from Memphis across the American South, the nation, and subsequently the world. 
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Eventually, Ray, traveling under one of his several aliases—Ramon George Sneyd, was 
arrested at London’s Heathrow Airport on June 8 (Sides 2010).  
The assassination had immediately sparked a wave of uprisings in over a hundred different 
cities, including the nation’s capital as African Americans expressed their fury (Risen 2009). 
By early June, a fragile calm had returned only to be rocked again by the assassination of 
Bobby Kennedy on June 5. As this murder reawakened memories of President Kennedy’s 
assassination in 1963, as well as King’s death, and as Americans reflected on the endemic 
violence within their society, news broke of the London arrest. While attempting to board a 
flight to Brussels, Ray was initially apprehended by Detective Philip Birch of Scotland Yard 
because an “All Ports Warning” had been issued for anyone claiming to travel on the 
Canadian passport of Ramon Sneyd (Sides 2010: 365-69). Accordingly, Ray was charged 
with traveling on a false passport and also with failing to have a UK firearms certificate for 
the .38-calibre Liberty Chief revolver that he was found to have, on his arrest. These charges 
ensured his detention, during which time the US authorities pursued a request for extradition. 
Ultimately, it was July 18 before Ray was placed aboard a C-135 USAF transport plane at 
Lakenheath Air Base in Suffolk and flown back to face trial in Memphis. Ray had somewhat 
unexpectedly announced that he was not going to contest the extradition any further on July 
16 (“News in Brief,” 1968). Thus, King’s suspected killer spent forty days in captivity in the 
UK, and using records from the UK National Archives that collate documents largely from 
Wandsworth prison, what follows will establish the extraordinary measures taken to ensure 
Ray’s safety and consider their significance.2 Given that the measures were taken by a British 
Labour government, largely at the insistence of the US government, the episode forms part of 
the history of the so-called “special relationship,” and it illustrates how even an embattled 
American government was able to make demands of a foreign government. This article will 
ultimately consider why the Labour government acceded to US wishes. 
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As already indicated, most of the literature on the King assassination consists of attempts to 
establish that a larger conspiracy lay behind the crime, even to the point of exonerating Ray. 
Such claims only relate to Ray’s time in England insofar as they raise the question as to how 
he was able to fund his escape to such an extent that he was able to travel internationally at a 
time when air travel was relatively expensive. Ray had traveled via Canada to London and 
then to Lisbon before returning again to London and seeking passage to Belgium(“Portugal 
Pact,” 1968). During these travels he attempted to reach African states like Rhodesia, Angola, 
the breakaway Nigerian state of Biafra, and the Congo, where he hoped to serve as a 
mercenary (Bigart, 1968). In the context of acute US official concern, the British government 
worked hard to ensure Ray’s safe return and trial for the alleged assassination of Dr. King. 
From the American side, this obsession with ensuring there was a trial that ended in a guilty 
verdict had two key components. First, there was the belief that this was essential to maintain 
the fragile peace in America’s ghettos. News of Ray’s arrest actually reached America while 
many people were watching the televised funeral of Senator Bobby Kennedy, and the New 
York Times reported that in Harlem the news brought “a sense of relief bordering on joy” 
(“Harlem’s Anguish” 1968: 1). Secondly, there was the realization that a successful attack on 
Ray, the prime suspect in this killing would reinforce the suspicion of government complicity 
in King’s assassination. Jack Ruby’s murder of Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas after the 
Kennedy assassination in 1963, captured live on television, remained in people’s minds, and 
claims that Oswald had been part of a larger conspiracy had garnered headlines in 1968. 
British motivation for the remarkable series of steps taken will be probed later, but first the 
details of the regime put in place to protect Ray deserve consideration, not least for the bitter 
irony that two states—the UK and the US—proved able to protect an assassin, whereas the 
US authorities, especially the FBI, had expended their resources harassing rather than 
protecting Martin Luther King (Garrow 1981). 
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The security measures taken were conspicuous from the moment of arrest. The Cannon Row 
police station where Ray (alias Sneyd) was intially held was sealed off with road blocks on 
both Cannon Row itself and Derby Gate(“No Quick Extradition,” 1968; 1). Reporters and all 
members of the public entering Bow Street Magistrates’ Court on June 10 were closely 
searched. London Times reporter Peter Waymark told readers that the detective searching his 
briefcase had asked him why he needed the scissors inside. Waymark explained that they 
were for press clippings and showed his press card before being admitted. He added that none 
of his experienced colleagues could recall being searched in this way before “Murder 
Warrant,” 1968: 1. American newspapers reported that while Ray was kept in custody on 
British charges, a further warrant was issued for his arrest in connection with King’s murder 
in Tennessee Schmidt 1968: 1.  
Prison records show that Ray under the name of Ramon George Sneyd was remanded to 
Brixton Prison after his brief first appearance at Bow Street Magistrate’s Court. He was then 
transferred to Wandsworth Prison to ensure greater security. Brixton held a larger number of 
remand prisoners and this meant that it had more numerous visitors (“Sneyd Moved,” 1968: 
1). There were fewer outside callers to Wandsworth where Ray was first examined by the 
prison doctor who took a medical history and concluded that the prisoner was in good health. 
The doctor also found no obvious psychiatric abnormality but in Home Office records this 
finding was supplemented in the written report by extracts taken from US sources that 
recorded that an earlier psychiatric assessment in October 1966, had detected a “sociopathic” 
personality type with “anxiety and depressive features.” A further Missouri prison assessment 
in December 1966 reported “obsessive-compulsive” symptoms. Weighed on four separate 
occasions during his stay, Ray gained 8 pounds in weight while in UK custody. The British 
were determined Ray would be returned not just unharmed but in optimal shape. 
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Accordingly, he was seen by the prison medical officer twice daily as part of a constant 
monitoring of his condition (“Medical Record). 
On June 13, Home Secretary James Callaghan agreed to the commencement of extradition 
proceedings (“Extradition Move,” 1968: 3). British officials attended meetings at the US 
Embassy where they met with the Assistant Attorney-General Fred Vinson and the 
Embassy’s legal attaché, FBI agent John Minnich to agree arrangements for Ray. Minnich 
confided that everyone in the US government from the President down knew that if anything 
were to happen to Ray, “Nothing would persuade the American public of the validity of the 
reasons given for any failure, and that disorders would unquestionably follow (“Mannock 
Report,” 1968).” In view of the scale of disorder that the US had experienced in the 
immediate aftermath of King’s death, the safe return and swift prosecution of his assassin 
was a government priority. Ray’s family also felt that he was in danger. The Associated Press 
reported that John Larry Ray had declared that the only reason his brother James would have 
killed King was if he were paid a lot of money, adding: “And those who paid him won’t want 
him sitting in a courtroom telling everything he knows” (“Brother Fears,” 1968: 76). The 
threats to Ray’s safety were compounded by his track-record of escaping from prison. British 
authorities were warned that he had escaped in March 1967 and alerted to the fact that at his 
last prison, drugs had been used “to impregnate clothing in order to produce a situation 
helpful to prisoners.” As a precaution, UK prison authorities provide Ray with two civilian 
suits and oversaw a change of clothes once a day around one of his exercise periods 
(“Mannock Report,” 1968). 
Faced with the twin threat of associates who might seek to aid Ray’s escape and enemies who 
might try to harm him, prison authorities were advised to monitor all visitors closely. 
Wandsworth’s Governor was to contact the Home Office before authorizing any visit. It was 
accepted that Ray had the right to legal counsel, and he was granted legal aid initially, but 
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even members of his legal team were searched to establish precisely what was being brought 
into Ray’s cell. The US government’s level of anxiety can be gauged from their request that a 
more thorough investigation be undertaken of building around the prison to exclude the 
possibility of a sniper attack on Ray’s cell or any other room to which he might be taken from 
a vantage point outside (Mannock Report 1968). They also requested that strict procedures 
prevent any unauthorized person from approaching Ray inside the prison, specifically in 
transit to the exercise yard and that similar precautions should preclude efforts to intercept 
him during his transportation to and from court appearances. Press reports on his court 
appearances allude to “a circle of heavily built Special Branch detectives, some of them 
armed,” that moved with the defendant as he walked from the dock to the witness box in the 
Bow Street court-room. “One stood next to him. Nine others shielded him from everyone 
except the magistrate and the lawyers” (Jordan 1968:5)  The American government 
specifically feared a possible helicopter escape and consequently, the British officials agreed 
that Ray was to be removed from the exercise yard immediately if any low-flying aircraft 
were detected (Mannock Report 1968).  
The prison authorities had already ensured that Ray was kept in a separate cell reserved for 
“special category” prisoners while on remand (“Orders for Reception,” 1968). However, 
records indicate that in addition, the wing of the prison that housed his cell was cleared of 
other prisoners whenever Ray was moved. Routine appointments, such as medical 
examinations, were conducted in Ray’s cell and if he left the cell, he was to be strip-searched 
on return with close attention paid to his clothing. In addition, Ray was to have guards with 
him in his cell at all times (“Instructions for Supervision,” 1968). They were instructed that 
their “grave responsibilities” were to guard against escape, suicide, and assassination. These 
written instructions stressed that they must stay with the prisoner no matter what he was 
doing, including bathing and using the lavatory. The cell was fitted with an alarm but in 
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addition each guard had a radio with its own security call sign. The security detail was to be 
visited in Ray’s cell by a chief prison officer half-hourly and hourly by a member of the 
Governor’s staff. Guards were to record anything that might be of importance in an 
occurrence book, and their roster was to be staggered to ensure that no two officers 
commenced or ended their time with the prisoner concurrently. A further prison officer, 
equipped with a radio, was to be stationed at all times within 20 yards of the cell window. 
Ray’s exercise breaks were meticulously monitored (“Instructions for Exercise,” 1968). The 
exercise was to be scheduled at no regular time nor for any fixed period but subject to five 
minutes’ notice and varied until the prisoner’s daily allowance was met. The exercise yard 
was to be searched before and after each session and the landing outside the cell and passages 
leading to the yard cleared of unauthorized personnel. If rain prevented use of the yard, the E 
Wing landing was to be used. While walking in the yard, the prisoner was to be accompanied 
by the duty officers alongside him at all times. The officer previously assigned to duty near 
the cell window was required to take a position at the entrance to the yard that allowed him to 
have both the yard and its surroundings within his field of vision. He would then return to his 
previous position. During exercise periods outside the cell, the cell itself was to be searched 
and any occurrence recorded in the log. Extra dog patrols were to be on duty at the perimeter 
during each exercise break. Officers were to ensure that the prisoner did not pick up small 
sharp objects in the yard that might be used in a suicide attempt. 
While wary of a suicide attempt, the graver threat was believed to come from others and so 
all visitors were to be subject to close scrutiny. The solicitors appointed to act on Ray’s 
behalf in relation to UK law were Michael Dresden & Company, and no one was to be 
admitted without their letter of authority (Mannock Report 1968). This policy was 
strengthened by instructions that no one was to be admitted until their permission to visit Ray 
had been cleared with both the Governor and Scotland Yard. In embassy conversations, it 
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was agreed that an American attorney, Mr. Fred Schwartz, was to be denied entry and that the 
same restriction applied to Ray’s brother, Gerald (Jerry). Anyone cleared to visit the prisoner 
was required to leave heavy coats and all parcels or bulky objects at the Gate security office, 
and no items were to be accepted for the prisoner (Instructions for Visitors, 1968). Any items 
brought in for Ray were to be reported to the Deputy Governor, who was also required to 
monitor and censor all outgoing and incoming mail. 
The solicitor assigned to Ray was Michael Eugene, who first met his client in Brixton after he 
had been remanded (Sides 2010: 377-78). Initially, Ray insisted that he was the Canadian 
Ramon George Sneyd and that this was a case of mistaken identity; he was not James Earl 
Ray. Eugene explained that he would represent Ray in relation to UK offences and the 
concurrent extradition proceedings and enquired if there was anyone he should contact. 
Blithely, the man calling himself Sneyd replied that Eugene should call his brother and when 
asked for a name and address, responded that his brother was called Jerry Ray and lived in 
the Chicago area. The bemused English attorney took down Jerry Ray’s contact details and 
listened while his client gave him a list of prominent US lawyers who should be contacted. 
Sneyd, who had been granted legal aid because he lacked funds to pay for counsel, told a 
perplexed Eugene that money was no object. Even if it were $100,000, he could raise it. 
By June 18, an extradition hearing had been set for June 27th on the understanding that if an 
extradition order were granted, the charges against Ray or Sneyd in the UK would be 
rendered moot. Extradition itself was not automatic and was generally governed by the 
Extradition Act of 1870 with further qualifications according to specific treaties 
(“Extradition,” 1968: 21). Under the 1931 Treaty with the United States, British courts could 
grant extradition only if US authorities presented evidence that was judged to be likely to 
have prompted a trial under British law. Moreover, a person extradited to face a specific 
charge under the treaty could not then be charged with other offences not specified in the 
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extradition application. Once his true identity had been confirmed, Ray could have been 
readily extradited on the basis of his being an escaped prisoner. However, it was obviously 
more important that he be returned to face murder charges in the King assassination case. To 
be sure of securing his return, the US instigated two concurrent extradition requests. The high 
public profile of the case and its political significance raised the possibility that Ray might 
contest extradition as a “political” prisoner who was unlikely to receive a fair trial. Article 6 
of the treaty granted any fugitive protection from political prosecution (Weisberg 2013: 16). 
When one considers the cumulative time and expense that Ray’s extradition cost, one has to 
wonder why the British government did not use its powers under the Alien Act to expel Ray 
as an undesirable on the basis of his attempt to travel on a forged passport. This would have 
prompted his rapid return to the US where he could have been summarily arrested. Even this 
process would have needed proof of his American identity as distinct from his claimed 
Canadian one. However, once fingerprints for the escaped prisoner Ray were compared to 
those of the arrested Sneyd, the fraudulent nature of the identity claim was proven. 
To use the Alien Act to expedite matters and evade the extradition procedure would have laid 
the Wilson government open to accusations that they were subservient to the Americans and 
had not protected Ray’s civil rights. Hostile writers, notably Harold Weisberg, have 
interpreted the conduct of the British government precisely in these terms (2013: 16-18). 
Weisberg argues that the British refusal to allow Ray’s chosen American attorney Arthur 
Haynes to confer with his client until after the initial extradition order was made, and their 
subsequent refusal to grant him legal aid to appeal that ruling constituted what he terms a 
“kind of repayment for American aid” (18). Such reasoning is tendentious, but demonstrates 
that the UK’s involvement in Ray’s safe return can be seen as an attempt to placate a 
powerful ally, especially since the Wilson government’s repeated refusal to commit troops or 
other military personnel to the Vietnam conflict had soured relations with the Johnson White 
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House (Ellis 2001). The full context is revealing. First, there was the intense international 
outcry at King’s murder, which made Ray’s arrest front page news. Then there was the 
concurrent concern over the state of British race relations symbolized by the Labour 
government’s pending Race Relations bill and the reaction to Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of 
Blood” speech, delivered on April 20 1968; just 16 days after the assassination and while 
American cities were wracked by racial violence (“Powell: stop them,” 1968: 3). Powell’s 
speech had elicited considerable public support, even while it had been condemned by the 
Conservative Party leadership under Edward Heath (Yates 1968: 8). Commentators feared 
that the racial violence dramatically televised in America represented Britain’s future unless 
it took steps to improve community relations. In these circumstances, it would have been 
remarkable if the Home Office had sided firmly with Ray, bending conventions on prison 
visitation rights and covering the sizeable legal costs for an appeal process that could go to 
the House of Lords. Despite dissimilarities, Ray’s potential claim for political asylum drew 
comparison at the time to the earlier case of Dr. Robert A. Soblen, who had been convicted of 
espionage in the US but fled while on bail (“Problems in extradition,” 1968: 3). In London, 
Soblen had appealed for asylum as a political prisoner and taken a fatal overdose of 
barbiturates rather than face deportation (Haynes and Klehr 2006: 225-27). But while the 
latter may be seen as evidence of the special relationship of the Kennedy-Macmillan years, 
the Ray case indicates nothing more than a politic choice; why offend an already irritated ally 
and do so in support of what looked like a very bad cause?  
Accusations of government interference circulated at the time in any case because Ray was 
not able to see his preferred American attorney. Among the lawyers Ray had mentioned to 
Eugene was Arthur Hanes, an Alabama attorney who first came to public prominence as a 
political figure in that ardently segregationist state. In 1963, Hanes had been mayor of 
Birmingham when Martin Luther King led a celebrated nonviolent protest campaign that 
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helped to galvanize a national coalition of conscience against racial segregation. According to 
one account on June 14 1968, Eugene phoned the law firm of Hanes & Hanes and spoke with 
its senior partner, explaining Sneyd/Ray’s predicament (McMichael 2015). He advised Hanes 
that his client had written a letter requesting Hanes to act on his behalf. Hanes declared that 
he would look out for the letter but also enquired if Eugene’s client had the means to pay fees 
and costs. Eugene said that “He gave me that indication, sir” (McMichael: location 253). 
Home Office records report that Eugene visited Ray at 2.45pm that day and given the time 
difference, he could have then placed a call to Hanes in Alabama (McMichael: location 251). 
As we know, the prison was keeping a record of Ray’s correspondence. This indicates that 
the first letter that Ray sent to Hanes was postmarked 19 June whereas the first letter received 
from Hanes & Hanes was dated 18 June 1968 (Record of Letters 1968). Following Eugene’s 
earlier phone call, therefore, it was the American attorney who took the initiative. US records 
indicate that Hanes tried unsuccessfully to pull strings to get a passport outside of normal 
office hours using his previous background as an FBI agent on June 16 (McMichael 2015: 
location 253). The next day he called a press conference outside his Alabama offices to 
announce that he was heading to London to serve as attorney for a prisoner about whom he 
claimed to know nothing. As a former mayor of Birmingham, Hanes’ remarks drew 
widespread radio and TV coverage, but also bafflement. The King murder trial would be in 
Memphis Tennessee and any defendant would logically seek an attorney registered to 
practice in that state. If the logic of a local lawyer had relevance across different American 
states, it had still greater pertinence between separate nations.  At the four-star Royal 
Lancaster Hotel near Hyde Park, London on June 20 Hanes gave a further press conference 
(McMichael: location 278). Asked if he would be allowed to see his client, Hanes conceded 
that this was unlikely since he was not licensed to practice law in the UK, but he was here to 
offer moral support. The press then asked who was footing the bill and Hanes insisted that he 
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was certainly not working pro bono; he expected to be paid. Reporters were well aware that 
Hanes’s most recent and notorious case had been to defend the Klansmen accused of the 
murder of Viola Liuzzo. Mrs. Liuzzo had been a volunteer helping to drive marchers back 
home after the Selma-to-Montgomery march in 1965, when she was shot to death (Stanton 
2000; May 2005).  
In defending the Klansmen accused of Liuzzo’s murder, Hanes had repeated in court the slurs 
and scurrilous accusations made by the white supremacist press against the Detroit 
housewife. Hence, the press asked Hanes if he was taking the current case as a segregationist 
lawyer. Hanes resented the inference. “You don’t label liberal lawyers ‘integrationist,’” he 
complained (McMichael 2015: location 278). The next day Hanes applied to visit Ray in 
prison and as he had anticipated, his application was denied. He was also informed that his 
putative client had less than £200 so was in no position to cover Hanes’s costs and fees. It has 
subsequently been alleged that Hanes had struck a deal with journalist William Bradford 
Huie who was keen to obtain exclusive access to the Ray story. Huie had made a lucrative 
career as a “check-book journalist,” writing sensational accounts of racial crimes, beginning 
with the confessions of the killers of Emmett Till after a Mississippi jury had found them not 
guilty. Pate McMichael (2015) has recently outlined the deal that allied Huie and Hanes. Huie 
would get the story with lucrative cinematic rights, and in return Hanes would get his fees 
covered and maintain his status as one of the leading attorneys for white supremacist groups.  
During a brief initial appearance in relation to his extradition on June 27, Ray showed that he 
was not going to remain a passive subject in the process. From his seat in the courtroom he 
objected to the testimony given by Detective Chief Superintendent Thomas Butler, head of 
Scotland Yard’s Flying Squad. Through his barrister, Roger Frisby, Ray told the court that 
Butler had falsely testified that when confronted with the allegation that he was James Earl 
Ray, Sneyd had said “Oh God, I feel so trapped” (Borrell, 1968: 2). Frisby presented the case 
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against the extradition requests by first seeking to establish that the request in relation to the 
Missouri prison escape was inadmissible on the technical grounds that the treaty stipulated 
that the offence should be robbery with violence whereas his client was convicted on a charge 
of robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon. On the second extradition request, Frisby 
questioned Ray in court to establish that he had no personal relationship with Dr. King and 
presented the testimony of a British journalist who had been to Memphis to establish the 
political climate there. The latter confirmed that King had been widely disliked by whites for 
his advocacy of racial equality. Were it proven that his client had killed Dr. King, Frisby 
argued, his motivation was not personal, but political, and as such was explicitly excluded by 
the extradition treaty (O’Callaghan 1968: 1). Before the hearing adjourned, the presiding 
magistrate indicated his concern that Frisby’s reasoning seemed to imply that the murder of 
any controversial public figure would have to be deemed a political act. Among the sworn 
testimony presented by American authorities were statements by three Memphis residents 
identifying Ray as the person seen close to the crime scene on April 4. Indicative of official 
fears on the American side, each of these witnesses had been removed from their homes and 
placed under police protection when reporters went in search of them in Memphis on June 28 
(Waldron 1968: 25).  
When proceedings resumed on July 2 Chief Magistrate Frank Milton indicated that the case 
for extradition had been accepted (“Magistrate Makes Order,” 1968: 3). On the basis of the 
verbal and affidavit evidence, he felt that Ray would have faced a trial under English law. He 
also ruled that the US had demonstrated that the man identifying himself as Ramon George 
Sneyd was in fact James Earl Ray. He rejected the defense claim that the offence for which 
Ray was imprisoned in Missouri was not governed by the treaty and he further ruled that to 
grant Ray exemption on the grounds that his actions were politically motivated would be to 
“extend the meaning of the Act far too far" (3) Ray made a further public statement in court 
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complaining that Chief Superintendent Butler’s comments had been reported in the US press 
and thereby prejudiced his chances of a fair trial. He also complained about the decision to 
exclude his US attorney Arthur Hanes, which he attributed to the Home Secretary to whom 
he had applied for permission to see Hanes and received no response. Given the grave 
circumstances he faced, he felt he should be allowed greater “freedom to write and receive 
visits from people” (3).  
The magistrate indicated that the extradition order would be stayed for 15 days to allow Ray a 
further chance to contest it. Ray had indeed written a number of letters of complaint; one 
directed to the then leader of the Opposition, Edward Heath, had actually been forwarded by 
the Deputy Governor to the Home Secretary (R.G. Sneyd 1968). Guards report that Ray was 
an avid newspaper reader, although his main interest was in any items relating to himself. 
The detective sergeant who accompanied him to court appearances, Alexander Eist—the two 
men handcuffed together at all times while in transit—has reported that Ray came to see him 
as a friend because he was able to get him American magazines and newspapers (Sides 2010: 
379). Ray had worked for the George Wallace campaign in California and continued to 
follow its progress. From the British press, Ray could also have gleaned that the Opposition, 
the Conservative Party was home to politicians like Powell who were similarly hostile to 
racial integration, and this, alongside the lack of an immediate response from the Home 
Secretary, may have prompted his letter to Edward Heath. In this letter Ray claimed that the 
Home Office had declined his request to see his attorney Hanes “on the grounds of security.” 
Ray wrote that this was “a very lame excuse” as they had “a special place here for such 
purposes” and described the partition arrangement with a small window which required “you 
talk through heavy screens” (Sneyd 1968). Ray refers to a previous Home Secretary Duncan 
Sandys as someone who could confirm this for Heath, and this supports the idea that Ray’s 
newspaper reading had made him familiar with UK politics. He ends his letter with a Cold 
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War claim that “even in Iron Curtain countries you can have visitors from one’s own 
country.” The letter also demonstrates that while in his interaction with the guards 
immediately surrounding him Ray was routinely described as polite and cooperative, he was 
also shrewd enough to seek to manipulate the wider political context. 
Hanes eventually got to visit Ray on July 5, accompanied by Michael Eugene. On the same 
day the Scottish MP Robert Maclennan asked the Home Secretary James Callaghan for 
clarification of his refusal to allow Hanes to visit and Callaghan’s written answer indicated 
that he first received a petition from Ray about Hanes on June 25 and that he authorized an 
ordinary visit since Hanes did not qualify for treatment as a special visitor under Home 
Office guidelines (Callaghan 1968). Hanes visited Ray again on July 6 when his request for 
time alone with his client was denied. Despite this, Hanes told reporters that he had no cause 
to complain about the restrictions placed upon him by the UK authorities “because that’s the 
system here” (“Lawyer Says,” 1968: 38).  
Following the extradition decision, the expectation was that Ray’s legal team would contest 
the order and the basis for their challenge would be that the extradition treaty forbade 
removal where the offence was political in character (“Ray Will Plead,” 1968: 10). If Ray 
ceased to maintain the fiction that he was actually Ramon Sneyd, it might be possible for him 
to explain that his assassination of Martin Luther King was politically motivated and he could 
have cited his commitment to the George Wallace presidential bid as evidence that he was 
vehemently opposed to King’s demands for racial equality. Of course, to do so would have 
been to plead guilty to the assassination charge and he had instructed his American attorney 
Arthur Hanes that he intended to plead not guilty. Thus, any elaboration of the “political” 
case against extradition was hampered by Ray’s decision to maintain his innocence at this 
point. Once back in the US, he did eventually enter a guilty plea before the court in Memphis. 
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As already demonstrated, British authorities established a regimen to ensure Ray’s safety 
based on constant surveillance. Thus, prison records include the guards’ reports on Ray’s 
state of mind and conduct. However, in reading these documents we must bear in mind the 
detailed instructions given to the guards, who have been left in no doubt that this is no 
ordinary prisoner and that they must maintain the utmost vigilance. On June 12, in an 
otherwise uneventful afternoon and evening tour of duty, his guard reported that Ray 
appeared “in good humour and respectful.” (Reports to Governor 1968) He discussed the 
Daily Telegraph’s report of his transfer to Wandsworth and the guard felt that he displayed 
some anxiety about references to the imminent “arrival of his finger prints from the U.S.A.” 
The same guard also noted his interest in firearms, observing that he took “great delight in 
retelling his use of them while serving in the American army as a military policeman.” Ray 
had also talked about the Robert Kennedy assassination suggesting that the “Black Moslem 
group” was involved and implying that it was also “behind the Martin Luther King shooting.” 
On a later occasion (June 16) Ray made a number of disparaging remarks about Bobby 
Kennedy, accusing him of “double dealing and getting rid of many of his enemies by making 
false charges against them, especially when he was Attorney General” (Reports 1968). His 
allusion to Kennedy’s pursuit of Jimmy Hoffa and other figures associated with organized 
crime (Neff 2015) may reflect gossip within the criminal underworld that Ray knew, but also 
the conspiracy theories widely circulating about the Kennedy assassination by 1968, many of 
which owed at least some of their credibility to the pre-trial murder of Lee Harvey Oswald by 
Jack Ruby (Scheim 1988; Davis 1993). But primarily his views reflected the reality that 
Bobby Kennedy’s tenure as Attorney General had “hurt” individuals close to Ray such as his 
one-time accomplice Arthur Rife. Reflecting on the closure of local gambling and 
prostitution rings, Rife told sociologist George McMillan: “There used to be a lot of money in 
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Quincy [where he and Ray operated] till Kennedy got in there. I wouldn’t shoot him, but I 
hate him for that reason” (McMillan 1976: 146).  
The next day (June 13), after a visit from Michael Eugene, Ray was reported as being “in a 
happy mood,” pleased at the prospect of staying in the UK for up to three months if he 
contested the extradition request (Reports 1968). Politics remained one of Ray’s preferred 
topics of conversation and he implied that his “present plight” might be due to politics, but 
the guard also noted that he qualified this comment by saying that “Martin Luther King’s 
assassination had been organized by one of his own lieutenants to gain control of the 
organization’s funds.” The guards got the impression that he was not greatly worried by the 
King murder charge in itself but was concerned that it might be changed to one of conspiracy 
to murder. Such comments clearly addressed political choices to be made by the Home 
Office. Technically, if the US government subsequently charged Ray with conspiracy to 
murder, the extradition would be invalid since this charge was not stated in either of the two 
applications for extradition. However, such comments can be readily taken by conspiracy 
theorists as signs that Ray had not acted alone. 
Another topic that Ray felt free to talk about with his guards was prison life. On June 15 the 
guard related Ray’s discussion of his previous prison experiences (Reports 1968). After 
complaining that his Missouri sentence for robbery was “illegal,” Ray chose not to disclose 
the method of escape he had used, saying wryly: “Could come in handy again.” Charged with 
armed robbery, Ray had insisted on acting as his own legal counsel, and had alleged that his 
confession, which he later repudiated in court, had been beaten out of him. He unsuccessfully 
appealed his 20-year sentence on the basis that his testimony had been obtained by violence 
and intimidation (McMillan 1976: 162-63). He also boasted to his British guards that he was 
“100 miles away before they began looking for him,” and revealed that he had a radio with 
him that enabled him to track his pursuers (Reports 1968).  
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The next day Ray asked his guards whether the escapes of “Great Train Robber” Ronnie 
Biggs (1965) and Soviet spy George Blake (1966) had prompted tighter security 
arrangements (Reports to Governor). It had in fact prompted the Mountbatten Report and a 
further report on the best policy for long-term incarceration of the most dangerous prisoners 
was submitted in 1968 (Admiral 1966; Radzinowitz 1968). However, Ray’s comments were 
read as underlining his interest in escaping, which he confirmed with the observation: “Well, 
I guess even with you two guys here they could bust me out.” Consequently, the guards 
informed their superiors that Ray was showing an active interest in escaping. They also 
reported that he had discounted suicide, saying to them on one occasion, “If they want me 
dead, they will have to kill me, I won’t help them out” (Reports 1968). Prompted by their 
superiors, the guards dutifully reported all suspect comments that might signal an increased 
risk of an escape attempt, and this amplified the wariness inherent to the prisoner-guard 
relationship. 
Ray’s American prison experience had been very different from the 24-hour constant 
monitoring he was experiencing in Britain. In his systematic profile of Ray, George 
Macmillan (1976: 166-68) offers a detailed portrait of the startling state of affairs in Jefferson 
City Prison, St Louis during Ray’s time there. Drawing on a joint Missouri legislative 
committee study from 1964, Macmillan describes a prison that had seen 145 stabbings 
between 1961 and 1963 (at a time when a well-run prison would have reported only one a 
year on average). The psychiatric unit was run by a man discharged from the armed forces for 
emotional instability. The hospital allowed a private doctor to conduct questionable 
experiments on prisoners and also housed a luxury suite for two prisoners who were the 
prison’s crime bosses. These were just the more conspicuous signs that the prison authorities 
were not in control. According to Macmillan, by the time Ray was admitted in 1960 the 
power relationship was so inverted that guards were buying their safety from key prisoners 
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with favors and gifts, and this situation was compounded by the low pay of prison staff, many 
of whom had to work a second job to make ends meet.  
In this context, Ray, who had first developed his skills as a black marketeer while stationed in 
postwar Bremerhaven, Germany, was able to establish himself as what in prison parlance is 
called a “merchant” (Macmillan 1976: 107-09; 171-72) He had a job in the kitchen which 
enabled him to obtain foodstuffs that had black market value. According to former inmates, 
he also operated a racket that exchanged prison script for hard currency, and advanced loans. 
However, his most lucrative trade was in drugs: amphetamine in particular. Ray is said to 
have amassed savings that he was able to smuggle out to his siblings with the complicity of a 
prison guard (179-83). Macmillan calculated that it would have been possible for Ray to have 
stashed away through this trade all the money he then used during his period on the run 
before and after the King assassination (196-99). The Congressional Committee that 
investigated the King assassination concluded that while some of Ray’s funds came from 
drug trafficking while in Mexico and California, the idea of his accumulating funds while in 
prison should be discounted in favor of the theory that on July 13 1967, James and his older 
brother John had successfully robbed a bank in Alton, a small town in southern Illinois that 
the Rays knew well from childhood (House Select Committee 1978: 5c).  
Ray’s multiple periods in jail had taught him many things and the most important was how to 
behave there so as to be safe and able to hustle without detection. British guards repeatedly 
reported that he was cooperative, respectful and polite. However, the drugs he once traded, he 
had also used (Macmillan 1976: 181). A hypodermic syringe was found in his London 
lodgings, and his guards reported intermittently that he found it hard to relax and settle unless 
he was sleeping (Reports 1968). They also reported that he had started doing press-ups to 
improve his muscle tone and get fit, possibly in preparation for an escape bid. One guard 
reported that he had declared that once he was able to do one hundred he would be ready, and 
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had added ominously “they can’t watch me all the time” [June 21]. The same guard related a 
conversation in which Ray said he was going to have to complain about the razor blades, and 
when the guard asked why, Ray joked that he had to have something to complain about when 
the Governor came around. 
The respect and cooperation therefore that Ray gave to his British captors was never 
complete. As the days passed, the constant monitoring began to irritate him especially as he 
learned via newspaper accounts that his various aliases had been tracked by the authorities. 
On June 21 when he returned in the afternoon from exercise he became incensed by the fact 
that various personal papers had been taken for inspection by the Deputy Governor. When 
these were returned, Ray tore them up and put them down the toilet, saying “if he wants to 
read them, they are down there, if he is so interested” (Reports 1968). This was around the 
time that he was expecting a visit from Arthur Hanes, whom he had asked to act as his 
attorney, and whose arrival in the UK had been reported in the press. The following morning 
(June 22), the guard reported Ray as being “withdrawn and sullen and rather restless.” The 
guard concluded his report by stating that in his opinion Ray would certainly try to escape if 
the opportunity arose and that his attitudes were typical of those who have been 
institutionalized; in the guard’s words: “he thinks he can beat the laws of any country he is 
in.” Yet even this mood did not last long since the afternoon duty guard reported that Ray 
became more talkative after supper and remained “polite and cooperative.” The lack of 
contact with his American lawyer remained a concern for Ray. However there is no evidence 
that the reluctance to admit Hanes was due to active collusion between the UK and US 
authorities. The US was required to present findings already obtained through witness 
statements and forensic evidence in order to secure Ray’s extradition. It was not permitted to 
use evidence obtained in the UK. Consequently, the two legal processes of extradition and 
trial were ideally to be kept separate. If Arthur Hanes was Ray’s choice as attorney for the 
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murder trial, his role depended on the outcome of extradition. Hanes’s profile as a lawyer 
eager to represent individuals charged with racially motivated murders and as a segregationist 
mayor of an infamously racist city certainly did not encourage the British authorities to waive 
customary practices. Ray’s agitation over his inability to see Hanes reflects therefore his 
misunderstanding of legal processes, and his eagerness to learn via a sympathetic source the 
extent to which the network of white supremacist groups might mobilize to support him. At 
the same time his discontent reinforced the tense atmosphere that the special security 
measures generated. 
The morning guard continued to report some hostility on June 24 which he attributed to a 
growing anxiety over the looming prospect of his return to the US and “the lack of 
communication between himself and his American attorney” (Reports 1968). The change of 
mood was confirmed by the afternoon shift, whose report noted that Ray had asked about the 
punishment regime in British prisons and had shown interest in whether the bar on the toilet 
[a substitute for a chain] could be worked free. This guard advised that the prisoner should be 
watched carefully for the next few days, yet added that he remained polite and cooperative. 
By June 25, all guards were reporting that Ray was in better spirits. His attendance at court 
on June 27 seemed also to improve his mood although he told his guards that a lot of lies 
were said at court, presumably referring to the comments of Chief Superintendent Butler. 
After the extradition orders had been granted, during the period when Ray should have been 
working to frame an appeal against going back to the US, guards reported that he remained in 
good spirits. In a lengthy report on July 3, the afternoon guard reported that Ray talked 
openly of an offer he had received from a US political group promising to cover all his legal 
expenses in the US. Their attorney, who was not Hanes, had written to tell him that his initial 
investigations made him confident that he could prove Ray’s innocence. With this prospect of 
help on his return, Ray felt that he would probably only remain in the UK for a further two 
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weeks. Finally, as a sign of his resurgent self-confidence, Ray had talked about how in the 
US there were various ways in which prisoners could bribe guards to assist them, especially 
because they needed extra money. He added pointedly that he supposed English guards might 
be the same (Reports 1968). Ray may simply have been joking in a teasing fashion, but in the 
context of the guards’ instructions, his remarks were deeply suspect and had to be reported. 
The surveillance regime meant that all meetings were monitored to check what was 
discussed.  On July 5, the guards filed a report on Attorney Hanes’s first visit (Reports 1968). 
They noted that Hanes was keen to tell Ray, whom initially he dutifully addressed as Sneyd, 
that he had been keeping a scrapbook of all the press coverage and was confident that Sneyd 
was going to make more money than he had ever dreamed. To this, Ray replied 
disingenuously that he wasn’t interested in money. When Hanes asked whether Sneyd was 
being well treated, he said he was but that he wasn’t used to English food. Hanes also told 
Sneyd repeatedly that it was very important that he say nothing further and especially that he 
should say nothing further when in court; thus signaling that he felt Ray’s public challenge to 
the detective’s testimony had been a mistake. From past experience, Hanes may have 
concluded that a defendant’s challenging of police testimony was likely to bolster its 
credibility rather than undermine it.  The listening guards also recorded that Hanes and Ray 
differed on the question of whether to appeal the extradition order. By this stage, Ray was 
keen to return to the US seemingly because he believed this would end the continuous press 
coverage of his case which he felt was prejudicial. He may also have grown weary of the 
intensive security regime, and notwithstanding his response to Hanes, he was probably eager 
to see what financial and promotional opportunities awaited him. With the British solicitor 
Michael Eugene, who would presumably oversee an appeal against extradition, in attendance, 
Hanes diplomatically insisted that Ray should have faith in the fairness of British courts and 
pursue his appeal. The guards also heard Hanes telling Sneyd that everyone knew who he 
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really was and that it was pointless now to continue to deny it. One guard reported that Ray 
accepted this fact placidly, but another noted that during the entire visit, Ray’s nervousness 
was signaled by his inability to keep his left leg still. When Ray was returned to his cell, his 
guards reported that he spent time making notes for Hanes’s next visit. He told them that he 
thought “they” [presumably his lawyers] were “guessing at what happened” and that they 
could “not do much” until he got to America and could tell them (Reports 1968). When asked 
by his guards whether he had told his attorney anything today, Ray replied: “No, I don’t trust 
that room too much and I had to talk through the wire with officers in the room.” Hanes’s 
follow-up visit the next day drew less comment from the guards although he did indicate that 
now that he had the names and addresses of Ray’s brothers and sister, he would try to stop 
them from giving interviews. James’s elder brother John had already implied that Ray might 
have murdered Dr. King to collect a bounty fee (“Brother Fears,” 1968: 76). A collective 
policy of no comment might well improve Hanes’s chances of exonerating his client. 
As has already been intimated, Ray was trapped in a dilemma with regard to appealing 
extradition. The strongest basis for doing so was to insist that he was a political prisoner who 
would not face a fair trial in the US, but to assert this cogently seemed to require him to admit 
that he shot Martin Luther King. In a letter of July 8 sent on his return to the US, Hanes asked 
Ray to consider the advantages of returning voluntarily to the US and issuing a statement that 
he was doing so in order to make his innocence “known to the world as soon as possible” 
(Hanes to Sneyd, 1968) A further practicality now intruded. Ray/Sneyd had been granted 
legal aid to cover the costs of defending himself against the charges brought by the British 
authorities and the initial requests for his extradition. However, he had to make a further 
application for such aid to cover expenses related to any appeal against the magistrate’s 
ruling in favour of extradition. On July 12, Ray learned that his application had been refused 
on the grounds that Ray’s counsel had not demonstrated that he had reasonable grounds on 
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which to dispute the extradition order. The arguments presented to and rejected by the 
magistrate in the initial hearing had been repeated but not strengthened. As a result, Ray told 
Hanes that he was now without British legal representation and so he was ready to accept 
extradition. Hanes returned to London and met with Ray on July 17 and 18 to discuss the 
details of his return (Information of Specific Importance 1968). At 5.45p.m. on July 18 Ray 
was informed that a surrender order had been signed by the Home Secretary. At 6.30p.m. he 
was asked by Wandsworth’s Deputy Governor if there were any matters or complaints that he 
wished to raise and he replied “No” and at 6.35p.m. he was discharged into the custody of 
Chief Superintendent Butler who was to lead a convoy of cars to the US Air Force base at 
Lakenheath.  
There, a giant C-135 cargo plane awaited (Sides 2010: 380-84). Butler officially surrendered 
Ray into the custody of the United States in the form of four FBI agents and an Air Force 
physician. The latter quickly checked Ray’s health before the six passengers and crew of 
three departed on a plane designed for 125 passengers or more. What the FBI dubbed 
Operation Landing had begun. The obsessive concern for Ray’s safety had not abated. With 
FBI agents replacing British prison guards, Ray remained under constant scrutiny. When the 
plane eventually touched down at Millington naval air base north of Memphis, it was met by 
a large and armed law enforcement entourage that included FBI special agent Robert Jensen. 
Local sheriff, William Morris was formally entrusted with the man identified as “James Earl 
Ray, alias Harvey Lowmeyer, alias John Willard, alias Eric Starvo Galt, alias Paul Bridgman, 
alias Ramon George Sneyd” in an exchange filmed by one of Morris’s deputies. Stripped 
naked on the plane, Ray was given fresh clothes and placed within a bullet-proof vest, heavy 
handcuffs and a leather harness. One of agent Jensen’s subordinates relayed every step of the 
process over the phone to FBI headquarters. Two lines of armed guards formed a corridor 
from the plane to a special armored vehicle, reputedly strong enough to withstand a rocket 
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attack. To mislead the media, Morris had a decoy convoy at Memphis airport to distract the 
press waiting there. When the armed convoy arrived at the Criminal Courts Building 
downtown, more guards stood on the rooves, rifle-wielding police lined the streets and a city 
bus acted as a screen to block any sniper’s view of the path from the armored car’s rear door 
to the entrance. Whisked by elevator to the third floor, Ray was placed in a fortified cell 
within a pre-existing cell, reputedly constructed exclusively for him at a cost of $100,000. 
Permanently illuminated, with closed-circuit cameras and multi-directional microphones, the 
cell was far more technologically advanced than what Ray had experienced at Wandsworth. 
But he remained what he had been since his arrest, one of the most vigilantly guarded human 
beings on the planet. 
As the moment of extradition approached, the British government had asked one of its 
consular staff in St. Louis to assess the mood in Memphis, and in particular to advise them as 
to the likelihood of Ray’s execution, if found guilty (“James Earl Ray,” 1968). An oral report 
was phoned through before the extradition occurred with a written report filed later. Capital 
punishment had fallen out of favour in European democracies, and in the UK a provisional 
Abolition of the Death Penalty Act had passed in 1965. The law would lapse unless replaced 
by 1970 (Parliament actually voted in favour of abolition in cases of murder in 1969). Hence, 
in 1968 the British government was mindful that its surrender of James Earl Ray was 
potentially sending him back to face capital punishment. However, the reports from Memphis 
were reassuring. While the death penalty remained in Tennessee, there had been moves to 
repeal it and the current practice of successive governors had been to leave inmates on death-
row indefinitely. Moreover, discreet enquiries directed at businessmen, bankers, and other 
Memphis residents, outside the legal profession, suggested that there was no great public 
clamour for Ray’s death. King’s widow, Coretta, indicated that she did not wish for the death 
penalty. Thus, the British government’s compliance with the American extradition request 
26 
 
would not produce the embarrassment of an execution. The consular report concluded: “I 
have found throughout my District an admiration for the part played by the British police and 
immigration authorities in the arrest of Ray. There is also an appreciation that British judicial 
procedures over extradition have been scrupulously correct” (“James Earl Ray” 1968: 5).” 
Reviewing Ray’s time in British custody, is it fair to judge it as “scrupulously correct”? At 
first glance, the scale of security measures taken to ensure that the man calling himself 
Ramon Sneyd could neither escape nor come to harm was extravagant. The obsessive care 
taken seems to reflect American fears bordering on paranoia, that only the safe return of this 
prime suspect could prevent a renewed wave of ghetto insurrections. The arrest of Ray, 
coming so soon after the assassination of Bobby Kennedy, which deepened further the sense 
that violence in the US was out of control, held out a possibility of closure, and with it hopes 
for a restoration of order.  The American Embassy in London was forthright in expressing 
these concerns, and it is clear that the British authorities judged it politic to accommodate 
Washington. In making this assessment, the primary consideration seems to have been the 
negative consequences of irritating an already disgruntled ally. The Labour government had 
been uncooperative on several major foreign policy questions and delivering this prime 
suspect in an infamous murder investigation must have seemed a reasonable way in which to 
soothe American suspicions. Ray, or Sneyd as he was currently calling himself, was a 
secondary consideration, but not an insignificant one. He had previously escaped from prison, 
had been convicted of robbery with at least the threat of violence, and during his time in 
custody, it emerged that he was probably guilty of attempted robbery of a jewelers’ shop 
while in London (Fletcher 2008: 4). He had false documents, a string of aliases, and the 
evidence presented by the FBI of a high powered rifle found near the murder scene with 
Ray’s fingerprints, of witnesses testifying that they had seen him at the scene, of evidence 
that he had purchased the rifle, binoculars and telescopic sights after engaging in 
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conversations about their merits with the gun-store owners, gave the British little scope for 
giving Sneyd the benefit of the doubt. Others will argue about a larger conspiracy, but in 
1968, the British authorities were determined that their police and prison staff should prove 
better than Texan ones had in Dallas five years earlier. Fifty years after Martin Luther King’s 
death, this is scant consolation. 
                                                          
1 The Race Relations Act of 1965 had founded a Race Relations Board. Its chairman, Mark Bonham Carter, 
went to the U.S. in 1967 to learn “lessons [from the] American experience,” the main one being “the necessity 
for a positive policy on the part of the central government.” The revised Race Relations Act of 1968 duly 
included more enforcement powers. See Bonham Carter (1967).  
2 These undigitalized records are classified as HO336/11. HO for Home Office; 336 for Prison Records and 11 
for Ray/Sneyd’s case file, all housed at the National Archives, Kew, England. 
